Jon Mills’s *Underworlds*

Kenneth Kimmel

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NAOMI AZRIEL, LMFT, is a depth psychotherapist in private practice in Oakland, California, and an advanced analytic candidate at the C. G. Jung Institute of San Francisco. She works with adults and children, with special interests in sexual, spiritual, ancestral, and cultural trauma. She has lectured and taught on the use of self in working with sexual trauma, queer sexuality, and sex-workers. Correspondence: 4287 Piedmont Avenue, Suite 108, Oakland, CA 94611, USA. Email: naomiazriel@gmail.com.

ABSTRACT
This review of the book The Psychoid, Soul and Psyche discusses author Ann Ulanov’s interweaving of Jung’s conceptualization of the psychoid level of the unconscious with both clinical and theological ideas. Central to this discussion is the idea that at significant moments in life and in analysis, we enter into a new mode of knowing that involves the shedding of all prior experience and points of reference. This transformative and impactful realm of experience is interrelated to religious ideas about the nature of God and the ways we humans can never fully know or comprehend God’s nature, nor our own wholeness.

KEY WORDS
analytic psychology, Anima Mundi, coincidence of opposites, individuation, God, C. G. Jung, Donald Kalsched, Samuel Kimbles, matrix, Nicholas of Cusa, psychoid, The Red Book, Self, theology, Ann Ulanov, unconscious, unus mundus

Jon Mills’s
Underworlds
An Essay and Review
KENNETH KIMMEL

For all readers who recognize the importance of the multidisciplinary spirit that Jon Mills’s works epitomize, I heartily recommend his book. In 170 distilled pages spanning 4400 years in the history of Western ideas, Mills has shown great care and impeccable scholarship to illuminate the diverse philosophies of the unconscious that underlie his ambitious survey of psychic underworlds. Reading it has been both demanding yet richly rewarding, a tour de force that has stretched me to my limits.

The ancients’ mythopsychological beliefs about the soul anticipated our contemporary discovery of psyche’s unconscious core. Mills introduces the Egyptian Book of the Dead with its depictions of mythical underworld migrations of the soul through death and rebirth. He then moves on to the classical Greeks and the divergence from belief in the immortality of soul ascribed to pre-Socratic and essentialist Platonism to the Aristotelian philosophy of soul dependent on corporeal embodiment.

Mills guides the reader from Western antiquity to nascent modernity, by explicating the metaphysical idealism in Hegelian dialectics. He moves on to Freud, Jung, and Lacan, the preeminent, widely divergent psychoanalytic voices of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, whom he considers the main exponents of the ontology of an unconscious.

Mills’s project encompasses the impact upon psychoanalytic and metaphysical thinking of those burgeoning, concurrent twentieth-century European philosophical systems of existential phenomenology shaped by Sartre and Heidegger. He concludes his opus with Whitehead’s “process philosophy,” based on the concept of an unconscious life-force that permeates the cosmos.¹

Mills illuminates the “ontologies of soul” through two primary lenses—dialectics and teleology.² His book is a dialectical text in its own right—and one that simply cannot be briefly summarized without being overly
simplistic. It is rare to find a writer with such acumen, whose rich discourses encompass both the great psychoanalytic theories of our day and the philosophical traditions they stand upon.\footnote{3}

Mills’s compact survey compares most with medical historian Henri Ellenberger’s magnum opus \textit{The Discovery of the Unconscious} (1970), which comprises 932 pages! As a phenomenologist, Ellenberger situated the pioneers of dynamic psychiatry in context and relation to their social, historical, and cultural surround, highlighting each one’s personal “creative illness” out of which their theories emerged. Yet, he largely overlooked the importance that philosophical traditions have had upon psychoanalytic thinking. For him, existence preceded essence. Whereas with Mills, his depictions seem to privilege the essence or ideas of the founders of depth psychology, respectively. This stance does present, at times, an abstract, removed quality to the tone and substance of Mills’s writing.

Mills begins his book with an idea attributed to Democritus. \textit{In reality we know nothing, for truth lies in the abyss}. While one would assume that these opening words speak to an \textit{unknowable} mystery, one that comprises the kernel of Mills’s opus, what we find instead is that Democritus, a pre-Socratic philosopher, held to the belief that the knowledge of genuine truth \textit{could} be achieved, but only through \textit{inductive reasoning}.\footnote{4} This idea anticipates the Hegelian dialectic of “negation” out of which the essential Truth is revealed, through \textit{logic and reason}.

In his own words, Mills privileges the “main metaphysical paragons that inform a \textit{systematic account} of the philosophy of the unconscious over the past 200 years . . .” (14, my italics).\footnote{5} He seeks to compare and contrast the “more coherently organized” systems in lieu of the unformed or undeveloped “terse and inchoate scatterings of allusions or references to unconscious processes” (15). These “outliers” include poets, romantic and transcendental philosophers, theologians, mystics, and, I would include, post-modern, post-phenomenological, and post-secular philosophers. This leads to my central critique of Mills’s fine work, which I will expound upon in the concluding remarks, that gives voice to those philosophers who call into question the privileging of a Logocentric viewpoint.

\section*{Introduction: Underworlds and the Ancient Soul}

Egypt and Greece, the great civilizations of antiquity, have bequeathed to us an array of religious and philosophical ideas. Mills begins his opus with a brief survey of their earliest mysteries surrounding death, the underworld, eternity, and the evolving vision of the soul’s life. He recognizes the correspondence of these motifs to analogous struggles within psyche for the emergence of consciousness from the darkness of unconsciousness.

\subsection*{Egyptian Soul}

Jon Mills regards the \textit{Egyptian Book of the Dead}, the mythic account of the soul’s journey through the underworld toward immortality, as one of the earliest cultural analogies for the birth of consciousness from the unconscious, what Freud describes as “a dark, inaccessible part of our personality ... a chaotic, seething cauldron” (Freud 1996–1995, SD 22:73). Through great ordeals of suffering and tests of moral character, truth and justice mediated over acts of good and evil, reason and emotion. Whereas
“agentic forces of higher wisdom” inculcated those worthy souls, impure hearts were doomed for eternity to the “cauldron of dead souls.”

**Hades, the Hellenic Soul, and Plato**

Hades, the dark underworld abode of souls, signifies the unseen uncanniness of the unconscious. Even in death souls retain a sense of smell, animated by the telos of the life-force of breath. Dialectically, souls are vestiges of life concealed, or aspects of psyche, dissociated from consciousness. In Plato’s prescient view of soul, higher reason and shame are components of our ethical being that strive for mastery over suffering and violent passions that seek to subsume them, reminiscent of Freud’s conflicts between id, ego, and superego, dramatized in the Oedipal struggle.

The soul as the very essence of humans is composed of endless dialectical oppositions. Although Plato recognized psyche’s interdependence on the body, he posited a dualistic and teleological essentialism regarding the immortality of the soul once separated from the body at death, as set forth in his creation story, *Timaeus*.

**Aristotle**

In contrast to the Platonic and Judeo-Christian position regarding the immortality of the soul, Aristotle’s soul cannot exist without a body. Neither is it a material object. Soul is a nondualistic monism comprised of psyche and soma as “differentiated elements of the same substance” (12). For Aristotle, “cognition” is the crowning glory of the human soul derived from sense perception and desire common to all species. Cognition comprises psyche’s faculty of imagination, which relies on recollection, memory, and reason. Imagination “actualizes” the “potentiality” of unconscious somatic sense perceptions, where the mind can then recollect them. This agentic process leads to self-consciousness and reflective thought—the soul’s pinnacle of achievement. Logic for Aristotle, Hegel, and Whitehead is, Mills opines, a shared human “superordinate process animating the universe . . .” that ascends from interior unconscious origins (13).

Mills passionately defends Aristotle’s prescient argument calling into question the duality of psyche and substance that has found resurgence in materialistic scientific circles. For example, the medical model’s invalidation of soul as an emerging unconscious process is exemplified by “evidence-based” treatment requirements that justify insurance companies’ reimbursement for mental health services. “The tendency today among the biological sciences to boil down mind to . . . neurochemical . . . substances . . . vitiates the philosophical need to preserve the integrity of soul as a vitalizing . . . generative . . . self-creative agency that [is revealed] within [its] embodied . . . natural . . . ‘thrownness’” (12).

**Hegel on Unconscious Spirit**

Hegel is the first Western metaphysician to demonstrate how reason is preceded by unconscious psychic forces, and the “unconscious abyss” is central to his philosophy (18). His concept of a “nocturnal mine” owes its origins to the Christian mysticism of Böehme, the German transcendental idealism of Schelling, and to Plotinus, the Neoplatonist. He diverges from their conceptions of a “non-being Divinity” that reveals itself, asserting instead that the nocturnal abyss is a psychic reality of becoming that preserves an infinite world of imagination prior to consciousness,
bringing to fruition a higher form of intelligence—cognition. Differentiation of Freud’s “I” from the “It” mirrors Hegel’s conceptions.

These conscious and unconscious structures engage in the lifelong process at the center of Hegel’s great unifying theory of mind, which is the basis of all mental operations and the collective force that innervates world history and culture; his opus is the precursor for Freud’s and Jung’s concepts of a personal and collective unconscious. Without the dialectical process, Mills contends, the very conscious/unconscious structure of the mind would collapse.

At the core of Hegel’s dialectical process are the concepts of Seele and Geist (from the German). Their respective English translations—soul and spirit, only approximate their fuller meanings. Seele is originally embodied in a corporeal existence, where natural drives and desires emerge. It is initially identified with an undifferentiated universal essence, an original unconscious unity shared by every gender, race, or culture. Individuals differ in Geist’s development. Geist’s essence carries both “spirit” and “mind,” or religious and “neurocognitive” implications. Mills’s close reading of Geist suggests the integration of the totality within the personality, from base desires to refinement of the ethical and moral development of character.

The dialectical movement of the unconscious drives self-awareness away from its original identification with the feeling Seele in its corporeal home—the place of Geist’s immediate, initial being. Through “sublation” after “sublation”—or Aufhebung—the unconscious produces violent contradictions in original determinations that are negated, preserved, and then transmuted, elevating Geist toward a “higher unity” of “pure self-consciousness . . . a unification of nature within mind” (19).

As a psychoanalytic inquiry, Mills cautions us about the futility of trying to achieve a “final cause” or perfected ideal as Plato posited. Rather, the human spirit must always try to surpass itself, to desire what it lacks and to continually create. He writes, “It is the striving . . . that forms . . . [a] transcendental orientation or philosophy of living, and, like the pursuit of wisdom and contentment, it is a process of becoming” (38). The world is under constant revision, or, as the philosopher Jacques Derrida proposes, the Messiah is always a venir—“to come.”

Hegel anticipates future conceptions of life emerging from suffering and death: “But the life of Spirit is not the life that shrinks from death and keeps itself untouched by devastation, but rather the life that endures it and maintains itself in it. It wins its truth only when, in utter dismemberment, it finds itself” (1809/1977, 32).

**Freud’s Unconscious Ontology**

Through the antinomy, negation, and synthesis from Psyche’s dialectical struggles, an evolving, conscious subject, Das Ich—the “I”—both familiar and defined, along with its “agent of moral judgement,” the Uber-ich (43), come into being from das Es—the “It”—the uncanny and unknowable “province” of unconsciousness. We experience the “It” through primary derivatives like dreams, fantasies, parapraxis (so-called Freudian slips), and symptoms. Preferring soul—the Greek psyche—over “mind,” Freud’s thinking evolved away from materialism and reductionism in his earliest neurophysiological theories of mind and from the fixity of reified mental structures.

As developmental and phenomenological, Freud’s conscious and unconscious dialectic encompasses irresolvable “contrary impulses”
and their integration, where abnormal pathology and adjusted mental states are determined by failed or successful expression, discharge and synthesis of psychic impasses (Freud 1933a [1932]/1966–1995, vol. 22, 73). Freud appears to privilege the “logo-centrism” of ego differentiation, recognizing the destructive pressures exerted on human consciousness by the primal drives of the “It.” The urge for civilizations to destroy in order to survive have led to the worst in humanity, falling under the rubric of the “Death-drive.”

Mills considers the death-drive Freud’s greatest contribution to the understanding of the unconscious psyche. Through Mills’s revisions, he critiques classical and relational schools of thought that either mechanize der Todestrieb (“death-drive”) or misunderstand the concept. The original English translation misinterpreted the German Trieb as “physiologically determined instincts . . .” that are static and genetically imprinted, applying only to animal species (48). Freud’s Trieb was meant to convey “drives” as a “dynamic . . . mutability” (48), where psyche is “a temporal flux [arising from an] archaic fabric of our corporeal nature, [transforming] over time . . .” (48). Psyche is an epigenetic achievement, Mills contends, that evolves from a dialectical, ontological monism (see Aristotle 350 BCE)—where inseparable, interpenetrating elements of lifegiving Eros emerge from Thanatos’s death-drive.

Mills considers “Death” an unconscious experience, an interior reality primary to psychic existence—not simply an actual life-ending state. Negation and death are, in fact, ubiquitous. In the Fort-Da game, for instance, Freud observed the dialectics of the death-drive in the play of his eighteen-month-old grandson who struggled with the loss of his mother when she went away for the day (53–54). Fort translates as “gone” and Da is “there.” Repetitively tossing a yo-yo away while uttering the word, Fort (“gone”) then bringing it back with the phrase, Da (“there”), the boy imaginatively reenacted his mother’s painful abandonment (a death-like gap) and then her joyful return (to life).

Ontologically, negative symptoms of aggression, self-destruction, trauma, and anxiety are induced by external stimuli and compulsively repeated through excitation and excess discharges. These lead to an unbinding of these tensions, where a previous state of peaceful bliss is restored—an ideal state of zero tension. The impulse to negate itself in death is, then, paradoxically, the origin and “aim of all life . . .” (Freud 1920/1966–1995, vol. 18, 38). The death-drive is located, as well, in the “perverse appeal to suffering” (58), from the repetitions of addiction to substances or bad relationships, to crippling shame, guilt, and self-destructiveness. This reveals the drives underlying the ecstasy in pain, or the “jouissance of masochism” (58), what Mills concludes “is an inherent destructiveness imbued in the very act of the pursuit of pleasure” (58).

Freud’s early “infantile sexuality drive-theory” fails to take environmental or epigenetic change into consideration. His mature dialectical structure of the organization of the unconscious posits that the sexual or aggressive drives originate in our somatic embodiment but are drawn to the object. The biological drives are not reductive but relational seeking (49). Mills buttresses the old master’s opus against contemporary psychoanalytic critique of his outgrown theories, richly illuminating Freud’s unending theoretical revisions, self-examination, and meaningful discourse around his evolving ideas. Jon Mills is proud to “stand with Freud.”
Lacan’s Epistemology

Jacques Lacan’s psychoanalytic theories are polemical, brilliant, revisionist, and at times inaccessible. His radical ideas were generally repudiated by French and American proponents of the classical Freudian growth and adaptation model for ego development. (The feeling was mutual!) His subversive notion of an imaginary “mirror stage” depicts “the six-month-old child [who] recognizes himself in the mirror and falsely identifies the reflection [that his mother shows him] as an image of the unified wholeness and mastery he does not in fact possess” (Kimmel 2011, 1). The I itself that takes form here is an artificial representation, a self split between its idealized mirror image and “[his] fragmented body/self with its accompanying experiences of terror . . . uncertainty . . .” and persecutory phantasies (Lacan 2006, 78; Kimmel 2011, 1). For Lacan, the imaginary has a primarily pejorative implication, considering it a narcissistic realm of illusion that negates the subject’s embodiment in the flow of life out of defensive demands.

While the imaginary “ego” is the first discovery of self, albeit a socially constructed illusion or wish, it is intersubjectively formed from the subject’s lack and its alienation of desire. The unbearable internalized anxiety and paranoia produced by images of the subject’s fragmented body must be split off, necessitating the manufacture of the mirror-stage’s “perfect image,” an illusion of a soothing, stabilizing, and unifying function.

In Lacan’s “Symbolic register,” we are born into a preexisting world of cultural, historical, and linguistic givens that determine the ground of the human subject. The unconscious is a category of culture, a “discourse of the Other.” Lacan situates the epiphenomenon of language as an exteriority that brings human subjectivity into being. The conscious Ego can never exist autonomously from the a priori constitution of the Other. Mills makes a strong argument against what he considers Lacan’s reifying of language and his environmental determinism, suggesting that it rigidly decenters intrapsychic agency.

Mills finds great vibrancy in the order of the Real, the mystery that is “foreclosed from epistemic awareness” and is impenetrable to the imagination or the symbolic (97). A preeminent ontology of the unconscious is revealed beneath its opacity. Contained within the register of the Real is Das Ding (Lacan 1959–1960/1992), the unconscious remainder never realized, the lack that drives all desire. In Lacan’s lexicon, the subject refers to what is unconscious and alien to self-awareness.

Heidegger’s penetrating discourse on aletheia (“unconcealment”) expands on the pre-Socratic’s original concept. Heidegger describes it paradoxically as the “unforgetting of [truth]—previously hidden” but always there—that is revealed (7). However, when something is disclosed, something else becomes covered over. This version of truth may never be fully known and averts the danger of a fall into idealism. Heidegger’s considerable influence on Lacan is evidenced by the latter’s own “diascopic of being in relation to lack” (116). For Lacan, the Real is what is lacking in the symbolic, its iterations only differentiated by the symbolic but never known in itself—“subjecting consciousness to the paranoid abyss of the ineffable” (117). The Real interpenetrates the imaginary and symbolic, where consciousness becomes an illusory shroud over unarticulated gaps beyond being—the true abyss.

Jung’s Metaphysics

Mills works conscientiously to elucidate Jung’s theory of the archetypes of the collective
unconscious. As a psychologist, philosopher, and humanist schooled in empirical logic, however, he cannot reasonably argue for the existence of a psychic reality that originates from a primordial, eternal, and omnipresent animating force, “superimposed on human experience” and passed on through the generations throughout history (120). Rather than this alleged psychologism, Mills makes the argument that “human experience becomes memorialized as communal knowledge that gives rise to social practices, symbols, rituals and linguistic order that inform cultural anthropology; and that these historical remembrances become trans-generationally and transculturally transmitted over the millennia” (141). Akin to Lacan, Mills conceives of a humbler vision of archetypes as psychic material originating from one’s own interiorized experience of images from the cultural, historical, and environmental surround we are born into, penetrating our nascent minds and on throughout our lifetimes.

Mills does struggle admirably to bridle his reason, recognizing the futility in trying to comprehend Jung’s intuitive and “felt noetic” opus through strictly rational thought. After fifty years of study I tend to agree. To understand Jung’s gifts to psychoanalysis, we indeed must enter a world of phenomenological experience comprising the interior and intersubjective, based in living with equal parts enigma and knowing. Jung speaks of the numinous archetypal process that shatters an individual as well as a nation-state (139). Jung’s research into the dialectics of alchemy produced his greatest scholarship. Jung’s revelations emerged out of a “mythopoetic,” hermeneutical, unconscious process of unending interpretations, unconcealed by the “dark sister” of the egoic complex—itself situated in an equal, horizontal relation to multiple unconscious complexes (and not the vertical hierarchy of Freud’s tripartite configuration).

Jung famously gets in his own way by subjecting his experiential depth work to a burdensome defense of his archetypal ontology as an “all encompassing defense of his archetypal ontology explaining most] facets of human psychology” (142) . . . “a universal theory of mind” (121). The collective unconscious forms the matrix of all things—the Neoplatonic idea of anima mundi where psyche and world interpenetrate one another. Jung relies on Kant’s “categories,” but more essentially on Platonic formal teleology—what he called the final standpoint—as a basis for his archetypal theory. The latter, pitted against Jung’s dialogical, clinical hermeneutics, illuminates the profound theoretical split that I believe prevented Jung from achieving the integration in his opus that he so desired. Given these things, Mills is justified in questioning the inconsistencies in Jung’s smeta-physical theories. At the same time, he acknowledges Jung’s original contributions, his tremendous scholarship, and the vision he revealed to us through his own “creative illness”—that of a “symbolic life” from which each individual might discover a path toward deeper meaning and authenticity in their lives.

Final Reflections and Critique

Given the stated parameters of his project, Mills has sought to uncover integrative, shared, and perhaps syncretic elements in diverse, often opposing systematic ontologies situated through history, while wielding a skeptic’s blade and critical eye throughout. His choice to critique these great minds is, as they say, the highest form of flattery. We might consider his work transdisciplinary.

The philosophical systems Mills describes in Underworlds attempt to integrate the complex mental phenomena at the heart of the human condition—namely, “[t]he powers of negation,
conflict, anxiety and death” (145). Human actions are determined, in part, by causes that are independent of our will, either “internally driven [Hegel, Freud, Sartre] . . . or externally imposed . . . or given [Heidegger, Lacan, Jung]” (145). Each of these theories shares a common thread—“the unequivocal avowal of the unconscious as a dynamic process” (145).

**Teleology**

Mills’s explication of teleology is exemplified throughout his book by the ontologies of Aristotle, Hegel, Freud, Jung, and Whitehead. At times, he faithfully represents the essential “final causality” of teleology and, at other times, offers important revisions and critiques.

The conception of Plato’s *Formal Teleology* is depicted in *Timaeus*, where the Creator desires to inscribe corporeal Chaos with order, by restoring the original Unity through formation of an eternal, perfect *Anima Mundi* that will bring about completion of the “Final Cause.” From this point of view the ordered, unchanging “Same” is dualistically and hierarchically privileged by the Creator over the temporal, imperfect nature of the “Other” (Plato 2010, 1841).

Hegel’s dialectical oeuvre resonates with elements of Plato, where consciousness emerges from an unconscious abyss, arising from a moral imperative to bring unity to Spirit and order to humankind’s destructive instincts—humankind’s “will to power” and evil inclinations—through knowledge. “All men by nature desire to know” (Aristotle, 350 BCE, Part 1). Can our so-called Essential Truths, driving the telos of moral development, overcome the resistance waged by the primitive drives of the unconscious? Or, from another perspective, has our striving for the light of consciousness become the deeper problem, when ever more light inevitably casts a darker, more power-driven shadow? In the wake of the Age of Enlightenment haven’t our greatest advancements in science and technology often contributed to the unleashing of the greatest horrors upon humanity?

The postmodern age raises these questions. Mills touches on them, as well, at the end of his chapter on Hegelian dialectics. “Does the abyss resist being integrated into spirit [consciousness]?” Does spirit itself struggle with a duality of desire or purpose, when the drive toward integration of the Absolute is simultaneously met by a rival impulse to draw back “within the abyss of spirit’s unconscious beginnings . . . toward the pit of its feeling life” (37)? If this nocturnal pit is home to the most primitive, destructive, and unconscious drives, then could a “true believer” obsessed by the attainment of Absolute Truth and Purity become the unwitting spawn of these horrors? After all, the most terrible atrocities throughout history have often been committed in the name of purity.

**Not Knowing**

Hegel’s and Freud’s ontologies recount Spirit’s and Ego’s respective ascensions from the negation of unconsciousness to executive roles that attempt to preside over the whole of psychic life. The goal of psychoanalysis is to thwart ignorance, overcome suffering, seek truth, and bring awareness to a self in the process of becoming. By valorizing the ego’s evolutionary achievements, where Darkness comes into the Light, sensuous nature strives to be Spirit, and *E*—the horse—gives way to *Ich*—the rider, Mills seems to diminish the importance of the *via negativa* in its own right, as the unknowable alterity of the abyss.

One could argue that a remainder is always left behind, beyond knowing, reason, or ontology,
an idea that Mills attributes to Lacan’s critique of knowing. One central idea prevailed between Lacan and Jacques Derrida—**différance**—Derrida’s signifier for the unknowable gaps and abysses between and beyond presence and being, the absence that defines presence.

**Other beyond Being**

Mills’s great criticism of the post-moderns is their attack on subjectivity and, more specifically, “consciousness and the teleology of the will” (73). In their defense, however, philosophers like Emmanuel Levinas and Derrida alert us to the solipsism in the conception of a “Grand Self.” Instead, they privilege a humble subject that answers first to the human other before him, in whose face a trace of Otherness lies, *exterior* to all being, infinitely *unknowable*, and *irreducible* to a “self.” Levinas calls this the mystery of “what is not yet . . . more remote than the possible” (1969, 254–255).

This is an abyss without categories and beyond being, whose *différance* could never be annexed into an ontology of a finite psychic underworld within the *totality* of a psyche. Levinas reverses the privileged order in Plato’s *Anima Mundi,* where ethics “for the Other”—signifying immanent temporal existence—*precedes* the unchanging perfect order of the “Same.” Appropriating the other’s utter uniqueness by “totalizing” it and making it into the same, Levinas contends, is the origin of all violence.

Franz Rosenzweig was a primary influence on Levinas. A former Hegelian scholar, Rosenzweig renounced the promise of academic fame, writing in 1917 of his deep disillusionment regarding the hubris of Hegel’s grand system of German Idealism and its “all-embracing World Mind.” His polemic cited failures to recognize individual human suffering in the world in the wake of the horrors of the First World War (Rosenzweig 1930/1971, xiv). Rosenzweig wrote, “The concept of the order of this world, is thus not the universal, neither the arche nor the telos, neither the natural nor the historical unity, but rather the singular, the event, *not the beginning or end, but the center of the world*” (quoted in Santner 2001, 14–15).

In concert with Rosenzweig, Mills admirably proposes his own antidote against an exalted Idealism. He turns our gaze to Aristotle and his depiction of soul as a monism constituted of soma and psyche—differing *embodied* elements sharing the same essence and situated soundly in relation to *terra firma.*

**Scholarship**

In conclusion, I wish to acknowledge the enormous energy that Mills has brought to his project. His attention to detail is impeccable. He refers us to primary sources and provides his own translations to texts, attesting to his brilliant scholarship. His command of the German language has freed the richer nuanced meanings of words burdened down by technical “antiseptic” English translations of the Hegelian and Freudian lexicons (40).

I have often heard that the practices of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy are the *instruments* and *operations* of philosophy. I wonder if the impetus behind Mills’s book originated from a grave concern he has that the scientific materialism of the day is systematically severing our discipline from psyche’s roots. Our over-specialized emphasis on results-driven, neuro-cognitive behavioral treatment has orphaned us from Psycho’s foundations as Soul and source of our developing singularity. Western philosophy throughout its long history (and endless territorial battles) has faithfully defended this truth, and I believe Mills’s volume provides the thread for those of us lacking even a rudimentary
philosophical education that leads back to the origins of Psyche’s awakening from her unconscious slumber. Without reservation, I commend him for his effort and encourage anyone interested in the philosophical origins of the unconscious to read this important contribution.

ENDNOTES

1. Due to space limitations I will be expounding on most, but not all, of the chapters that speak the strongest to me and are most relevant to this readership, while only briefly mentioning the nonclinical work of philosophers, Sartre and Heidegger, and Whitehead, respectively. Their exclusion here is in no way reflective of their lack of importance to Mills’s project.

2. Mills illustrates how teleology can range between a “formal,” “final cause” that realizes original preexisting Ideals or Essences, and a self-creative, ongoing, epigenetic process of becoming that is not pre-formed in design.

3. Donna M. Orange’s Thinking for Clinicians: Philosophical Resources for Contemporary Psychoanalysis and the Humanistic Psychotherapies (2010) is worth noting as a comparison, although lacking in the scope and weight of Underworlds.

4. Inductive reasoning is a logical process in which a general truth is drawn through observing particular phenomena that are believed to be true or are true most of the time.

5. References to Mills’s work are cited by page number only.

6. Mills privileges monism throughout his survey of philosophies to avoid religious conflicts.

7. I’m afraid many Jungians still carry the old prejudices of “Freud’s reductivism” due, in part, to Jung’s oversimplification of Freud’s views on sexuality and the failure of many Jungians to acknowledge the evolution in Freud’s thinking.

8. Jung’s section is strategically placed before Mills’s chapter on Alfred North Whitehead—a philosopher of the natural sciences and an atheist. They share common ideas, though differ in their epistemology. Whitehead’s “individuation” process, which “unifies” material of the cosmos, is framed by a teleology containing never-ending epigenetic transformations unbound to history or final cause, unlike Jung’s general adherence to a formal teleology of the archetypes—his “final standpoint.” Mills calls into question Jung’s idea of psyche, imbued by a “world imbued,” in favor of the scientific proposition of Whitehead who “makes God an abstract unifying principal—the non-temporal [coalescing] of all eternal objects . . . .” (148).

9. Telos, meaning “end, purpose, or destiny”; logos, meaning “reason or explanation.” I refer you to Horne, Sowa, and Isenman (2000).

10. I refer you to Hinton et al. (2011).

11. Lacan is credited with some version of this saying, “The more that knowledge piles up, the more the soul screams.” Ladson Hinton, personal communication.

12. See pages 7–8 in Mills for the pre-Socratic discourse on aletheia—the “unconcealment of the hidden while simultaneously, something else is covered over,” which Heidegger later expounds upon (Heidegger 1930/1977, 78).

13. See “Teleology” (page 132) of this essay.

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ABSTRACT

This essay reviews *Underworlds: Philosophies of the Unconscious from Psychoanalysis to Metaphysics* by Jon Mills. Ancient Egyptian and Greek tales, depicting the eternal soul’s journey through death’s abyss to immortality, are followed by Aristotle’s nondualistic conception of soul, dependent on embodiment, that consists of elements of the same substance—*soma* and *psyche*. From Aristotle’s germ cell, the author’s logical discourse unfolds, elucidating the most systematic and coherent accounts of Western unconscious ontologies over the last two-hundred years in chapters that feature Hegel, Freud, Heidegger and Sartre, Lacan, Jung, and Whitehead. The dialectical process underlies the rising of consciousness from a psychic abyss, not from a universal, supernatural one. Mills adeptly interprets and synthesizes diverse, complex theories. The author’s revitalization of misunderstood concepts in the Freudian lexicon, such as *der Todestrieb*—the Death Drive—contains his greatest insights.

KEY WORDS


Slipping and Sliding Between Fact and Fiction

The New Myth?

DENNIS PATRICK SLATTERY


"People will believe anything if you are properly dressed."

John Dickens, in the 2017 film biography of Charles Dickens, *The Man Who Invented Christmas*