Aristotle’s ontogenesis: a theory of individuation which integrates the classical and developmental perspectives

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Abstract: The effects of the classical/developmental split in analytical psychology are described. No underlying issues explaining the nature of the split have been clearly enunciated. The schools can, however, be distinguished by their differing epistemologies. These are the hermeneutic and transcendental branches of phenomenology. The use of these epistemologies leads their proponents to either an immanent or transcendent concept of the divine, respectively.

The theoretical break between Freud and Jung can, in part, be attributed to their espousal of determinism and teleology, respectively. This conflict has been continued in analytical psychology with the developmentalists most often advocating determinism, and the classicists usually championing teleology. The dissimilar causal theories lead to different concepts of the nature of individuation.

Aristotle’s fourfold theory of causality, of which determinism and teleology are two categories, can be seen to be an ontogenic theory rather than a classification of causal influences. Applying his theory to the process of individuation provides an ontogenesis that more accurately describes the process itself, and unifies the developmental and classical theories.

Intimations of this formulation in Jung’s work are described. More explicit conceptions of this idea in the work of two contemporary analytical psychologists and that of Wilfred Bion are also presented.

Key words: Aristotle, determinism, epistemology, immanent, individuation, ontology, teleology, transcendent.

Introduction

For the past 20 years the battle in analytical psychology has been fought between two opposing perspectives, the developmental and the classical. The developmental perspective, sometimes called the clinical approach, centres around the work of Michael Fordham in London. The classical perspective, which is often called the symbolic approach, centres around the work of
Marie-Louise von Franz, though it has also found important exponents in Neumann, Adler and Edinger.

Andrew Samuels has proposed that the schools can be distinguished by their emphases on key aspects of theory and practice (Samuels 1985). Theoretically, Samuels points to the definition of the archetypal, the concept of self, and the development of the personality. The practice areas, in which he finds divergence, are the analysis of transference/countertransference, emphasis on the symbolic experience of the self, and examination of highly differentiated imagery.

Samuels claims that, in the theoretical area, the classicists place greater emphasis on ‘the integrating and individuating self’, and the developmentalists do so on the ‘personal development of the individual’. Stated thus there appears to be almost no distinction between the groups. Both are emphasizing the loosely defined development of individuality. In the practice area, his distinction is clearer. Samuels says that the classicists focus on the symbolic experience of the self, whereas with the developmentalists the self unfolds through the transference/countertransference.

While Samuels’s approach has been helpful in providing a basis for discussion, he did not formulate any of the fundamental issues underlying the dispute. In a simple way, the distinctions between the perspectives in the practice area could be seen as a difference in the clinical weighting of inner versus outer experience. This has echoes of the split in Freudian thinking which produced ego psychology (Hartmann 1939).

Without a guiding heuristic, those Jungian analysts who are not devotees of a particular perspective have practised eclectically, appropriating pieces of each theory to use them mosaically. This is similar to another situation which developed in psychoanalysis in the United States, when object relational and self psychological approaches began simultaneously to prove acceptable to ego psychologists (Pine 1988).

Eclecticism is always a state of truce. It occurs when the heuristics of each group are exhausted, and are no longer developing the respective theories. This results in analysts who use different theories for different clinical situations since they have no overarching theory to account for these diverse phenomena. At such times, the theoretical problems of the discipline as a whole need to be redefined for progress to recommence. For example, in the early 1980s in psychoanalysis, just such a redefinition was made by Jay Greenberg and Stephen Mitchell (Greenberg & Mitchell 1983). These authors proposed that the three major psychoanalytic schools, ego psychology, self psychology, and object relations theory, were all struggling with the theory and practice of the patient’s relationships with objects. This redefinition of the basic issue has stimulated contemporary psychoanalysts to emphasize the self-in-relation, a perspective which has produced fruitful developments, particularly in the understanding of child development (Stern 1985), and in the therapeutic use of countertransference (Ogden 1994).
Epistemological distinctions

I became interested in this problem of the classical/developmental split when, as a candidate in review and certification, I became unwittingly caught up in its issues. From the classical side, I was told that I was not having a symbolic analysis, and that I was putting too much emphasis on technique. I was to get out of the way and let the Self do its work. From the developmental side, I was told that I was not related enough to my patient’s experience, and was grilled on the minutiae of my countertransference.

In an attempt to find some underlying cause of the split, I tried a typological analysis, as Jung had done to understand the differences in the psychologies of himself, Freud and Adler (Jung 1921). Unfortunately, I was not as successful as I had hoped. While doing this research, however, I wrote a review of several books on typology (Horne 1996). I disputed the view that typology was a traditional personality classification based on behavioural traits. Rather, I took the perspective that typology was a classification based on the individual’s preferred mode of developing and evaluating experience, what I called epistemological modes. I concluded that Jung had discovered an epistemological distinction between the psychologies of himself, Freud and Adler. I, therefore, tried to delineate the epistemologies of the classical and developmental schools, looking for their use of traditionally understood epistemological modes. I began this project by examining the work of Polly Young-Eisendrath, a developmentalist who overtly stated that she had a constructionist epistemology. This is a derivative of the hermeneutic or existential phenomenology of Heidegger (1962). I contrasted her work with that of Ann Ulanov, a contemporary representative of the classical view. Ulanov was also explicit concerning her epistemology, which was Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology (Husserl 1970). In a paper published in the San Francisco Jung Institute Library Journal (Horne 1998), I proposed that it was this difference in phenomenological epistemologies that characterized the developmental/classical split.

Phenomenology developed from general hermeneutics, which was originally the art of interpreting religious texts. The etymology is from Hermes, the god who could unlock meaning. In the nineteenth century, hermeneutics was applied to the study of all historical and cultural creations. By the end of the century, it had been further expanded to become a methodology of all the human (non-physical) sciences, contemporary and historical (Palmer 1969).

Despite the development of hermeneutics, by the end of the nineteenth century, the subjectivism of this method had led physical scientists to consider the human sciences to be inferior bodies of knowledge. Its practitioners were criticized because they could not go beyond the external expression of human experience to uncover its basic nature. This required a new epistemology and Edmund Husserl, a mathematician turned philosopher, furnished this (Husserl 1970). Following Brentano (1973), Husserl said that all conscious mental activity is consciousness of something, that is, it is directed towards some
object that is desired, contemplated, perceived, imagined, etc. This process was called intentionality (Hall 1993; Mohanty 1995). Husserl said that the way in which consciousness intends its objects and the meaning of the experience of the objects can be apprehended by a self-reflection in which one excludes one’s prior assumptions. He called this process bracketing. Husserl’s method came to be known as transcendental or universal phenomenology as he claimed that the bracketed self-reflection reveals the a priori or foundational conditions of experience that enables the discovery of the essential nature of the intended objects. He (1970) said:

The empty generality of the epoch (bracketing) does not of itself clarify anything; it is only the gate of entry through which one must pass in order to be able to discover the new world of pure subjectivity.

The term transcendental was first used by Aristotle (1960) to refer to a category that transcended or extended beyond the bounds of any single category. It was subsequently used to refer to metaphysical categories. In the late 18th century, it was applied by Immanuel Kant (1965) to what he maintained were the built cognitive capacities of the mind, which he called categories, that organized sense data into knowledge. For example, Kant said that such organizing principles as time, space and causality were not facts of nature but were created, via the action of the categories. The mind thus conceived Kant called the transcendental ego. Experience, as conceived by Husserl, has been called transcendental subjectivity (Frede 1993; Palmer 1969).

The concept of the transcendental ego strongly influenced Jung who, wanting to remain a scientist and yet opposed to its materialist empiricism, found in Kant’s formulation an epistemology that could be considered to be scientific. This was because it was grounded in the universal data processing functions of the mind (Clarke 1992; Nagy 1991; Jung 1898). Jung equated the attitudes and functions of his typology with Kant’s concept of mental categories. He also defended his concept of the archetypes in this way, maintaining that they were Kantian like categories through which the mind processed experiential data (Clarke 1992). It is surprising that Jung never referred to Husserl in his writings in view of the fact that Jung often called himself a phenomenologist (1938) and his concept of archetype is more similar to Husserl’s concept of a basic template of experience than Kant’s concept of a category of cognition (Tougas 1996).

Martin Heidegger, Husserl’s student, while endorsing phenomenology as a method of disclosing experience, said that bracketing was impossible as we are always in our world with some set of assumptions. He went so far as to say that the idea that one could obtain indubitable knowledge of objects via bracketing or any other method was itself an assumption. He said that in our ordinary everyday dealings with objects we use them in practical activities that involve other people and express our purposes. Heidegger asserted that, rather than each category of objects or humans having some essential and fixed
meaning it is the ways in which the objects (including people) fit into one’s activities that gives them their meaning. For example, when our car is running smoothly we drive it without conscious awareness in order to get to work or pick up our children after school or do the shopping. We understand activities like this without explicit awareness in a way that is intrinsic to accomplishing them. If we step back from the activity to reflect on it, we engage in what Heidegger calls an interpretation that is historically conditioned and socially contextualized. He (1962) says:

In interpreting, we do not, so to speak, throw a ‘signification’ over some naked thing which is present-at-hand (scrutinized as an object), we do not stick a value on it; but when something within-the-world is encountered as such, the thing in question already has an involvement which is disclosed in our understanding of the world, and this involvement is one which gets laid out by the interpretation.

This type of interpretive activity is what has come to be referred to as hermeneutic phenomenology (Palmer 1969).

The classicists seem to be transcendental phenomenologists since they propose that, via the thrust of the archetypes, the mind is intending towards meaning. Ann Ulanov (1975) says:

If we could bracket all our preconceptions – lay them aside for the moment and look directly at what is before us, phenomena might be allowed to show themselves to us directly, in their and our immediacy.

The developmentalists, by contrast, place more emphasis on hermeneutic phenomenology since they tend to see experience as more contextualized by personal history and the personal transference/countertransference. Polly Young-Eisendrath and James Hall (1991) say:

Knowledge or structuring of thought is assumed to emerge from the natural processes of development of human life as an interpersonal or relational affair.

Ontological distinctions

While both Husserl and Heidegger did establish new epistemologies, their primary project was to create a foundational or formal ontology that would describe the being of all possible things (Dorstal 1993). Husserl wanted to create a common ontology for the human and natural sciences, apprehended, via transcendental subjectivity, as the essence of the acts of consciousness of objects and the acts of consciousness themselves (Mohanty 1995; Husserl 1970). Husserl’s ontology contradicted Kant’s, who said that the transcendental ego was the limiting factor in human understanding and, therefore, one could never know the ultimate essence of an object, what he called the thing-in-itself (Kant 1965).
By contrast, Heidegger wanted to do away with the concept that being was a metaphysical property of objects. He said, rather, that being could only be disclosed by individual humans and this occurred as a function of the totality of their meaningful involvements with objects, including other humans (Heidegger 1962). He called this disclosed quality of objects their presence. It was well captured by the Impressionist painters in their emphasis on the surface, the immediate moment in time, and the embeddedness in a web of relationships, of objects (Arnason 1969). In the same time period Marcel Proust eloquently grasped the nature of presence in his novel Remembrance of Things Past (Proust 1981). At the end of the overture to the first section of the novel he writes of the taste of a madeleine evoking in the narrator the immediacy and ephemerality of the labyrinth of relationships of objects in his childhood home that subsequently extends into connections with the town and countryside in which he lived.

In the case of presence related to humans themselves, this is expressed via, what Heidegger calls, ‘existence’. By this he did not mean just being alive but, rather, the acts of living out one’s possibilities for being in the light of one’s human and personal limitations. Taylor has described this as ‘engaged agency’ with one’s world (1993). Via this engaged agency, Heidegger said, humans disclose new possibilities for being with their world and thus enter a process of dynamic being or becoming.

I think it is possible to distinguish Husserl’s and Heidegger’s ontologies on the basis of whether they locate being transcendentally or immanently in relation to human experience. In Husserl’s case, despite the fact that being is discovered via subjectivity, it is accessed by detached apprehension of objects in the process of bracketing. It is a particular type of scrutiny of objects that places the observer in a position that is outside of or transcends the world of things. By contrast, while Heidegger also says that the being is disclosed subjectively, it is accessed from a position of immersion within experience. He calls being ‘being-in-the-world’ to emphasize the inseparability of being from world.

This ontological dispute among phenomenologists is ongoing, as shown by a spirited exchange as to which is the ‘true’ phenomenology that occurred between Cecil Tougas, a transcendental phenomenologist, and Roger Brooke, a hermeneutic phenomenologist, in a recent edition of the San Francisco Jung Institute Library Journal (Tougas 1996; Brooke & Tougas 1997).

Theological distinctions
Since all Jungians, I think, seem to have some notion of a divine influence in human life (Guggenbuhl-Craig 1996), the ontological claims of the classicists and developmentalists might be framed in theological terms. Again, taking Ulanov and Young-Eisendrath as examples of the two schools, they agree that at the heart of analytical psychology is the concept of the transformative
function of the divine, which emerges when opposite attitudes can be held in
tension. Ulanov, however, sees it as a transcendent other in relation to the ego
of the patient (1996). She says:

When we take notice of this reality, it responds by showing us how it functions in
us, and this response in turn elicits our cooperation. This process quickly changes
how we experience the Transcendent, moving from seeing it as something that
simply happens to us, whether good or bad, to having an ongoing conversation with
a presence that touches us intimately and reveals itself as altogether Other.

By contrast, Young-Eisendrath (1996) does not see the divine as emanating
from a source. Rather, she says it is the manifestation of the coherence and
unity which is the ground of all matter, both animate and inanimate. She says:

When we experience the self (Self) as a function, then we begin to feel our inter-
dependence on everything else and to see how we merge into all that surrounds us.

These differing views reflect the prevailing conceptualizations of the divine,
as transcendent or immanent, within their respective religious traditions,
Christianity (McGrath 1997) and Buddhism (Rahula 1978; Zimmerman 1993),
respectively. I am claiming that these orientations towards the divine are
derivative of the differing phenomenological epistemologies and ontologies of
the classicists and developmentalists.

Jung (1944) was, I think, referring to these differing definitions of the divine
as a point, and as a totality, and attempted to resolve this ontological paradox
as follows:

The self [Self] is not only the center, but the whole circumference which embraces
both conscious and unconscious; it is the center of this totality, just as the ego is the
center of consciousness.

Despite this elegant metaphorical unification of the transcendent and
immanent divinity, Jung did not pursue this idea in his clinical theorizing,
continuing, to the end of his life, to privilege the transcendent divinity.

Both Brooke (1991) and Young-Eisendrath and Hall (1991) have shown
that Jung’s phenomenological epistemology was also both transcendental and
hermeneutic, although he had no clear understanding of the issues involved.
Tougas (1996), however, maintains that Jung was predominantly a transcen-
dental phenomenologist. I would agree with her conclusion, and note that Jung’s
epistemological preference is logically associated with a transcendent ontology.

Causal distinctions

In addition to the differences in epistemology, ontology and the nature of the
divine, there are differences between the classical and developmental schools
in their conceptions of psychic causality. This dispute about psychic causality
predates the classical/developmental split as it begins with Jung and Freud.
In a recent paper, written with colleagues from the object relations and ego
psychological schools (Horne, Sowa & Isenman 2000), we outlined the origins of this dispute. It was the continuation of a long-standing conflict in theories of causality in Western thought (Schnadelbach 1984). This dispute was taken up by Jung and Freud at the birth of psychoanalysis. Contrary to the traditional view that their break was caused by their differing concepts of libido, we maintained that it was caused by their differing theories of psychic causality, with Freud being the determinist and Jung being the teleologist.

Teleology and determinism were first proposed as modes of causality by Aristotle (1950, 1960) when he developed his four-fold causal theory. The first of the four categories is the efficient cause, that which triggers the beginning of the process that leads to the development of the object in question, what we now call determinism. The formal cause is the ‘blueprint’, or potential, that guides the process of development and specifies its organization. The material cause is the matter out of which the object is made, and the final cause is the natural end point of the process at which the object emerges in its fully formed or actual state. For example, in the case of the oak tree the material cause is the particular organic chemicals out of which it is made. The efficient cause is the stimulus in the soil that causes the acorn to germinate. The formal cause is the genetic organization in the acorn that guides the process of development, and the final cause is the oak tree, the full expression or actuality of the process of development. The Greek word for this final, or complete, expression is telos, and thus the use of the term teleology to describe this mode of conceptualizing causality.

In our paper we claimed that Jung remained to the end of his life primarily a teleologist and that Fordham (1957), the developmentalist, early in his career split from Jung’s classical view by espousing a deterministic theory of deintegration and integration (see below). Fordham did, in his later theorizing, see the Self as having an ego integrating potential (1964). Therefore, his theory, while on the whole being more deterministic, is, nevertheless, a complementary or eclectic mixture of both forms of causality, efficient and final that does not integrate the two forms of causality into a coherent theory (Fordham 1958). Subsequent developmentalists have either followed Fordham or have incorporated deterministic elements of Kleinian or self-psychological theory into a classical framework, again in a complementary way (Casement 1998).

**Individuation distinctions**

The different causal emphases of the classicists and developmentalists lead them towards different theories of both the goal and processes of individuation. Jung said that psychic development occurred as a result of the compensatory relationship of the unconscious to consciousness via the mediation of the Transcendent Function (1916). He said that this involved the differentiation of the individual from the norms of the social collective via the realization of the individual’s archetypal potentials, albeit in a unique form (1928).
archetypal realization progressively leads, Jung said, to an experience of an inner divinity which he called the Self. Later, Jung described the Self as the archetype of completeness, implying that this state was the telos of self realization (1950).

Jung formulated the concept of individuation through his analytic experiences with older adults. His emphasis on the differentiation of the self from the social collective, I think, led him to conclude that the process was only a feature of late life development. Other classicists such as Joseph Henderson (1967), Erich Neumann (1954), Edward Edinger (1972) and Francis Wickes (1927) have described processes of ego development in childhood and adolescence. However, all these authors see individuation proper as occurring in mid or late life via teleological causality.

In contrast, Fordham in his early theorizing proposed that individuation occurred throughout the life span. He rejected, as metaphysical, previous attempts by Perry (1953) and Baynes (1940) to describe the efficient cause of individuation as an instinct that was operative from birth. Fordham, instead, proposed that there exists a primal Self from which the ego individuates via deintegration, a process that is instigated by the relationships with the objects of the child’s experience. These part-ego/object fragments are then reintegrated into the established ego and this then forms a more complete ego structure (Fordham 1957). Fordham (1958) says that ‘his’ ego evolves from the Self, whereas ‘Jung’s’ ego is a separate entity in a relationship to the Self.

Aristotle’s ontogenesis

Rather than it being a complementary theory to Jung’s, I think, Fordham’s early theory of individuation contradicts Jung’s classical theory. This is why, I think, Fordham’s individuation is not seen as ‘true’ individuation by the classicists. Like Freud and Jung, I think that the early Fordham and Jung split Aristotle’s categories of determinism and teleology. However, I think, it is more correct to read Aristotle as not proposing mutually exclusive categories of causality but, rather, an ontology that includes a multi-component causality.

He describes a set of influences which, taken together, are necessary to explain the being and becoming of living things, and the cosmos in its totality. He is formulating an ontology of living beings, and not an isolated causal theory of their activities. Deterministic causality is, as the potential to become, inherent in being. In the development of a living thing, this potential becomes motion, which is exhibited as change. Change, however, is also influenced by the formal blueprint in the becoming to produce the telos. The process includes both efficient and final causal influences acting in concert. Aristotle’s ultimate telos for human beings was, like Jung’s, the progressive realization in humans of the God nature, which he called the unmoved mover. However, he also saw the unmoved mover as the primal efficient cause of all worldly activity.
Jung’s theory of individuation is predominantly teleological. Despite this, in his paper on the child archetype (Jung 1951) he does imply that the effects of the child archetype are similar to the Aristotelian primal efficient cause. He says: ‘the child paves the way for a future change of personality’. Explaining this further, Jung says that the child archetype is the representation of the centre which occurs between the psychic opposites when they are fully constellated. He (1951) says:

It (the child archetype) anticipates the figure which comes from the synthesis of conscious and unconscious elements in the personality. It is, therefore, a symbol which unites the opposites; a mediator, bringer of healing, that is, one who makes whole.

In describing the action of the child archetype in this way Jung is returning to his first description of the Self in which he said (1929):

But if the unconscious can be recognized as a co-determining factor along with consciousness, and if we can live in such a way that conscious and unconscious demands are taken into account as far as possible, then the center of gravity of the whole personality shifts its position. It is then no longer in the ego, which is merely the center of consciousness, but in the hypothetical point between conscious and unconscious. This new center might be called the self [later written as Self, para. 67].

In these two statements Jung is equating the child archetype with the Self, saying that it (the Self) is a force (an efficient cause) that initiates new meanings that moves the psyche beyond its currently constellated opposite perspectives.

In the paper on the child archetype Jung also says: ‘It (the child archetype) represents the strongest, the most ineluctable urge in every being, namely the urge to realize itself’ (Jung 1951). This is a deterministic formulation, and, when taken together with Jung’s teleological view of the Self, indicates that he was intuited the dual nature of the Self even if, by continuing to privilege the Self as telos, he never made this explicit.

A unified theory of individuation

Two recent papers in this Journal, by Cecil Tougas (1999) and by Sherry Salman (1999), I think, link efficient and final causality and, therefore, give a clinical reality to the ontological theory of individuation implicit in Aristotle’s views and intuited by Jung. In her paper, Cecil Tougas uses a development Husserl made in his theory, which he called double intending. This occurs when, in the process of intending towards discovering the meaning of a past event, one’s whole experience also intends towards oneself. In the confluence of this double intending, meaning evolves. Tougas equates the intending to the past event with the intentionality of the ego, and the intending towards oneself with the intending of the Self. This unifies deterministic and teleological viewpoints.
Sherry Salman (1999) proposes that the Self creates meaning, via symbolic transformation, and that it is operative in psychic life from birth. She says:

There is no Self *per se*, either structural, functional, or transcendent, that is unknowable because it exists only as a symbol of process, as part and parcel of the psyche’s *acts of creation* – the creation of new psychological reality and ground (itals. in orginal).

Implicit in Salman’s description of these acts of creation of the Self is, I think, Aristotle’s unified theory of causality.

The unified principles of causality that Aristotle described are, I think, a depiction of the nature of the Self. This nature is two sided and yet unified. The two aspects are, like Aristotle’s efficient and final causes, interdependent and, therefore, inseparable. These two aspects of the Self are, I think, its symbol creating and its meaning organizing functions. These functions correspond to the Self as the instigator of the individuation process, and to the Self as the organizer of meaningful totalities. This unified concept of the Self can give us a theory of individuation which is the same at all stages of life. It could as well occur at any of the transformative stages of life (Erikson 1963), at age 2 as a child struggles with its thrust for autonomy or at age 16 in the process of adolescent identity formation or at age 50 at the ‘mid-life crisis’.

How might a unified concept of the Self relate to Jung’s concept of psychic transformation? In his 1916 paper ‘The transcendent function’ he gives a description of the transcendent function that is almost identical to the one he gives of the child archetype. He says of the transcendent function:

> Once the unconscious mind has been given form and the meaning of the formulation is understood, the question arises as to how the ego will relate to this position, and how the ego and the unconscious are to come to terms. This is the second and more important stage of the procedure, the bringing together of opposites for the production of a third: the transcendent function.

If we include Jung’s first description of the Self could we say that the child archetype, the Self and the transcendent function are equivalent?

**Bion’s theory of psychic transformation**

Bion’s theory of psychic transformation has much in common with Jung’s and can help to clarify a unified theory of individuation. In his early theorizing, he proposed that the basic element of mental life was raw sense impressions and emotional experiences which he called beta elements (1984a). He said that in order for meaning to emerge, beta elements had to be converted to units of thought that he called alpha elements. He called this conversion process alpha function. Comprehensible thought then accrues by the linking of alpha elements into meaningful wholes (1984b).

Bion said that consciousness was characterized by a struggle between the tendency for linking and unlinking of organized thought (1984c). Linking
produced knowledge, which could be further reorganized in a process he called transformations in knowledge which he shortened to K (1984d). In his later theorizing, he introduced the concept of O, which signified the ultimate unknowable, which was always in potentia (1984d, 1984e). Its components emerged into consciousness when ‘catastrophic disruptions’ in linking occurred. I think that these manifestations of O can be equated with the beta elements of Bion’s early theory since he gives such a similar description of both types of experience (1984a, 1984e). He said that the manifestations of O are organized in a process that he called transformations in O (1984e). He said that this led to radically new understandings. Bion distinguished this process from transformations in K that, he said, produce what seems to be new knowledge but is, in fact, just conventional knowledge created by a rearrangement of what one already knows (1984d, 1984e).

In our recent paper on psychoanalytic theories of causality, we said that Bion’s theory of psychic transformation transcended determinism and teleology taken in isolation but we did not state clearly how this occurred (Horne, Sowa & Isenman 2000). The emergence of the components of O, as a result of the collapse of the links in thought, seems to be equivalent to what Jung describes as the manifestations of the child archetype that occurs when aspects of the unconscious come into a conscious relationship with the ego complex and collapse its hegemony. Jung said that this can occur under conditions of excess activation of the unconscious or relative weakness of the ego complex (1928). This emergence of the components of O is the determinist element in Bion’s theory. The formation of meaningful thought by alpha function is his version of the teleological influence on the psyche. The latter is similar to what Jung claimed occurred as a result of the action of the Self as the organizer of meaningful totalities (Culbert-Koehn 1997). Thus in both Jung’s and Bion’s theories we have a theory of psychic development that unifies efficient and final causality into an ontogenic theory, that is, one of becoming.

Summary

The classical/developmental split in Jungian psychology is characterized by different epistemologies which, in turn, lead to different concepts of the divine. These different concepts of the divine are not distinct, but are, in effect, the two aspects of God, namely, the transcendent and the immanent. Furthermore the Freud/Jung split was on the basis of their different concepts of psychic causality, that is determinism and teleology, and that this difference also characterizes the developmental/classical split. Returning to Aristotle’s complete causal theory, from which the concepts of determinism and teleology were taken, I have proposed that his formulation unifies the different causalities. Thus he creates a theory that explains the evolution of being.

Finally, since it appears that individuation and the evolution of being can be equated, Aristotle’s theory provides a basis for a unified theory of individuation.
I think that the efficient cause is the psyche’s symbol forming capacity, and the final cause is the psyche’s capacity to organize symbolic elements into meaningful structures. Jung describes these functions as the child and Self archetypes respectively. I maintain that these functions are not distinct, but are integrated aspects of the Self. I think that Bion makes a less archetypal, but none the less very similar formulation of this process of becoming.

Andeutungen dieser Formulierung in Jung’s Werk werden beschrieben. Ebenso werden stärker ausformulierte Konzepte dieser Idee im Werk zweier zeitgenössischer Analytischer Psychologen und im Werk von Wilfred Bion vorgestellt.

Vengono descritti gli effetti della scissione classico/evolutivo nella Psicologia Analitica. Non è mai stata formulata chiaramente nessuna ipotesi che spiegasse la natura di tale scissione. Comunque le scuole possono essere distinte dalle loro differenti epistemologie. Queste sono le branche ermeneutiche e trascendentali della fenomenologia. L’uso di tali epistemologie spinge chi le segue a un concetto del divino rispettivamente o immanente o trascende nte.

La rottura teoretica tra Freud e Jung può, in parte, essere attribuita all’averre sposato, rispettivamente, il determinismo o la teleologia. Questo conflitto è continuato nella Psicologia Analitica tra gli evoluzionisti che più spesso sostengono il determinismo e i classicisti che di solito difendono la teleologia. Teorie differenti della causalità portano a differenti concetti sulla natura dell’individuazione.

La teoria quadrupla della causalità di Aristotele, di cui il determinismo e la teologia rappresentano due categorie, può essere vista come una teoria ontogenetica più che come una classificazione di influenze causali. Applicare la sua teoria al processo di individuazione ci fornisce un’ontogenesi che descrive in modo più accurato il processo stesso e unifica le teorie classiche con quelle evolutive.

Vengono descritti accenni a questa formulazione nel lavoro di Jung. Vengono inoltre presentate concezioni più esplicite di questa idea nel lavoro di due Psicologi Analisti contemporanei e in quello di Wilfred Bion.

En este trabajo se describen los efectos de la ruptura entre las orientaciones clásica y desarrollista. Ningún tema subyacente que explique la naturaleza de la ruptura han sido enunciados con claridad. Sin embargo, las escuelas pueden diferenciarse por sus diferentes epistemologías. Estas son las ramificaciones hermenéuticas y trascendentales de la fenomenología. El uso de estas epistemologías lleva a sus proponentes hacia un concepto inherente o trascente de lo divino, según la teoría sustentada.

La ruptura teórica entre Freud y Jung puede, en parte, atribuirse a su adhesión al determinismo o la teleología, respectivamente. Este conflicto ha continuado en la Psicología Analítica con la defensa del determinismo por parte de los desarrollistas y a promoción de la teleología por parte de los clásicos. Las distintas teorías causales llevan a diferentes conceptos sobre la naturaleza de la individuación.

La cuádruple teoría de Aristóteles sobre la causalidad, de la cual el determinismo y la teleología conforman dos categorías, puede ser vista más como una teoría ontogénica que como una clasificación de influencias causales. Aplicando su teoría al proceso de individuación provee una ontogénesis que describe más adecuadamente el proceso en sí mismo, y unifica las teorías clásica y de desarrollo.
Se describen indicios de esta formulación en el trabajo de Jung. También se presentan conceptos más explícitos de esta idea en los trabajos de dos Psicólogos Analíticos, así como en el de Wilfred Bion.

References


Jung, C. G. (1898). The Zofingia Lectures. CW supplementary volume A.


